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ABSTRACT 
 
Current discussions about the need to reduce unit labor costs (especially through a 
significant reduction in nominal wages) in some countries of the eurozone (in particular, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) to exit the crisis may not be a panacea. First, 
historically, there is no relationship between the growth of unit labor costs and the growth 
of output. This is a well-established empirical result, known in the literature as Kaldor’s 
paradox. Second, construction of unit labor costs using aggregate data (standard practice) 
is potentially misleading. Unit labor costs calculated with aggregate data are not just a 
weighted average of the firms’ unit labor costs. Third, aggregate unit labor costs reflect 
the distribution of income between wages and profits. This has implications for aggregate 
demand that have been neglected. Of the 12 countries studied, the labor share increased 
in one (Greece), declined in nine, and remained constant in two. We speculate that this is 
the result of the nontradable sectors gaining share in the overall economy.  Also, we 
construct a measure of competitiveness called unit capital costs as the ratio of the 
nominal profit rate to capital productivity. This has increased in all 12 countries. We 
conclude that a large reduction in nominal wages will not solve the problem that some 
countries of the eurozone face. If this is done, firms should also acknowledge that unit 
capital costs have increased significantly and thus also share the adjustment cost. Barring 
solutions such as an exit from the euro, the solution is to allow fiscal policy to play a 
larger role in the eurozone, and to make efforts to upgrade the export basket to improve 
competitiveness with more advanced countries. This is a long-term solution that will not 
be painless, but one that does not require a reduction in nominal wages. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Discussions about the need to regain competitiveness in the euro area have taken center 
place in policy forums in the context of the current crisis. The issue is particularly 
important for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. No matter how the crisis started, 
analysts have concluded that these countries suffer from a competitiveness problem (i.e., 
workers are too expensive, especially given their labor productivity). Given that 
devaluation is not possible because they all use the euro, and that the monetary union has 
imposed fiscal rigidity and removed monetary independence, it appears that adjustment 
has to come through the labor market. Therefore, policy discussions have focused on 
analyses of unit labor costs. A number of economists have concluded that to close the 
“competitiveness gap,” in particular with Germany, requires downward adjustments in 
relative wages in these five countries (Black 2010), i.e., the so-called internal 
devaluation.
1  
Unit labor costs are defined as the ratio of a worker’s total compensation, or 
money-wage (i.e., the nominal wage rate plus all other labor-related costs to the firm such 
as payments in-kind related to labor services, social security, severance and termination 
pay, and employers’ contributions to pension schemes, casualty, and life insurance, and 
workers compensation, and, in some cases, payroll taxes as well as fringe benefits taxes, 
etc.), to labor productivity. Assuming the numerator is measured in euros per worker and 
the denominator is measured in numbers of pencils per worker, the unit labor cost is 
measured in euros per pencil (i.e., total labor cost per unit of output, or the cost in terms 
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where wn denotes total labor compensation, q is physical output, and L is employment 
(e.g., number of workers). 
                                                  
1 Paul Krugman, for example, has written extensively on his blog advocating this view of the problem. For 
example, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/et-tu-wolfgang/   3
Firms, obviously, do care about unit labor costs because they track the 
relationship between their total labor costs and how productive workers are. If a firm’s 
unit labor cost increases, and even more so vis-à-vis those of its competitors, most likely 
it will lose market share and its growth expectations will be negatively affected. The 
solution to this problem is a combination of wage restraint and labor productivity 
increase, the latter usually achieved by introducing labor-saving techniques that are 
profitable. 
Increasing productivity is not easy and does not happen overnight. Besides, the 
determinants of productivity are not well known. In a recent survey, Syverson (2010) 
summarizes a wealth of literature and classifies its determinants into two groups: (i) 
factors that operate primarily within firms and under the control of the management;
2 and 
(ii) factors external to the firm. The latter operate indirectly through the environment by 
affecting producers’ willingness and ability to harness factors that affect firms.
3 Syverson 
admits that it is not clear which one of the determinants is more important quantitatively 
and further research is needed. In discussions, often the policy recommendation to 
increase productivity is to reform, especially the labor market.
4 
 A decrease in the nominal wage rate faces all sorts of psychological and legal 
problems (Blanchard 2007). The question is whether this is the solution to the current 
crisis. Would workers in countries like Spain, where unemployment affects over a fifth of 
the labor force, accept a reduction in nominal wages to maintain their firms’ 
competitiveness and this way keep their jobs? 
A key issue that seems to have been forgotten by the participants in this debate is 
the well-documented lack of empirical relationship between the growth in unit labor costs 
and output growth. This is referred to in the literature as Kaldor’s paradox (Kaldor 1978; 
see chapter 4 of McCombie and Thirlwall [1994] for a discussion). Kaldor found, for the 
postwar period, that those countries that had experienced the greatest decline in their 
price competitiveness (i.e., highest increase in unit labor costs) also had the greatest 
                                                  
2 Syverson mentions the following: (a) managerial practice/talent; (b) higher-quality general labor and 
capital inputs; (c) information technology and research and development; (d) learning-by-doing; (e) product 
innovation; and (f) firm structure decisions. 
3 Syverson mentions the following: (a) productivity spillovers; (b) competition; (c) deregulation or proper 
regulation; (d) flexible input markets. 
4 See, for example, Allard and Everaert (2010).   4
increase in their market share. Hence, the belief that low nominal wage growth vis-à-vis 
that of productivity will restore competitiveness and eventually lead back to growth is at 
best too simplistic and does not have strong empirical evidence. Indeed, if the argument 
about the importance of unit labor costs as a measure of competitiveness were so simple 
and straightforward, researchers would have long ago found an unambiguous relationship 
between them and growth rates. In the context of the analysis of Harrod’s multiplier and 
the balance of payments constraint, Kaldor (1970, 1971) argued that the growth rate of an 
economy depends on the growth rate of exports, which itself depends on world demand 
and the international competitiveness of exports. According to Kaldor, export 
competitiveness depends on the dynamic evolution of money wage and of productivity. 
The evidence on the inverse relationship between output growth and the growth rate of 
unit labor costs is, paradoxically, inconclusive, because at times researchers have found 
that the fastest growing countries in terms of exports and GDP in the postwar period have 
at the same time experienced faster growth in their unit labor costs than other countries, 
and vice versa.
 5, 
6 In the words of Fagerber (1988): “This…indicates that the popular 
view of growth in unit labor costs determining international competitiveness is at best too 
simplified. But why?”
 Fagerberg (1996) revisited this enduring puzzle by analyzing the 
period 1978–1994 and concluded that the paradox also holds for this period.
7 
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss a number of problems with the recent 
work on unit labor costs in the eurozone and the policy recommendations derived from it, 
                                                  
5 Kaldor’s argument was, in fact, a bit more sophisticated. His conclusion of an inverse relationship 
between output growth and the growth in relative unit labor costs (i.e., the differential between the growth 
rates of the unit labor costs in two countries) depended on two more equations, one expressing money 
wages as a function of labor productivity, and Verdoorn’s law. 
6 Kaldor (1978) compared growth in unit labor costs and growth in value in market shares for exports for 
12 countries for 1963–1975. He found that for some of these countries, the relation between the two 
variables was positive. Kaldor concluded that no analysis of international competitiveness could be carried 
out by merely considering cost factors, and that the inclusion of other circumstance, such as the role of 
technology, was necessary. See De Benedictis (1998). 
7 From standard specifications of export and import equations, assuming long-term balanced trade, and that 
firms set prices by applying a mark-up on ulcs, Fagerberg (1988) showed that the growth of output ( y ˆ ) can 
be modeled as  * * y ˆ   ] c l ˆ u c l ˆ u [ y ˆ δ γ + − = , where the superscript * refers to the rest of the world, ^ 
denotes growth rate, and the parameters γ , δ are functions of the price and income elasticities of exports 
and imports. In this formulation, economic growth is written as a function of the growth in relative unit 
labor costs and world demand. The variable γ  is a function of the export-price and import-price 
elasticities, and will be negative provided the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (i.e., that the sum of 
these two elasticities is greater than one).   5
in particular the need for a large internal devaluation. We argue that the way unit labor 
costs are calculated, using aggregate data, has influenced the discourse, yet it is 
potentially misleading. We acknowledge that the crisis has many aspects that we do not 
discuss (e.g., the debt situation). The analysis in the paper concentrates exclusively on the 
use of unit labor costs in the discussion. 
A first problem is that the calculation of unit labor costs for the whole economy 
cannot use equation (1) because the measure of aggregate output is not a physical 
quantity, but the economy’s value-added. This has two important implications. The first 
one is that unit labor costs calculated with aggregate data are no more than the economy’s 
labor share in total output multiplied by a price effect. While this is true also at the firm 
(product) level, the difference is that at the aggregate level, one cannot calculate unit 
labor costs without using an aggregate price deflator. This is not true at the product level 
with physical data (see equation (1)). The second implication is that this brings about a 
discussion of the functional distribution of income between labor (wages) and capital 
(profits). Parallel to the notion of unit labor cost, we define the concept of unit capital 
cost—the ratio of the nominal profit rate to the productivity of capital. The idea of a 
growing unit labor cost puts the burden of adjustment on the workers. It may well be that 
profit rates grow (fall) faster (more slowly) than capital productivity with a consequent 
increase in unit capital costs, hence also reducing competitiveness. Moreover, if all unit 
labor costs reflect is, essentially, the distribution of income between labor (wage share) 
and capital (profit share), this can explain Kaldor’s paradox. And certainly, this argument 
has important macroeconomic implications (effects on aggregate demand) that seem to 
have been forgotten in current discussions. 
Second, we show that unit labor costs calculated with aggregate data are certainly 
related to the firm-level unit labor costs. But the former is not a simple weighted average 
of the latter. It is possible that firm-level unit labor costs decline while the aggregate unit 
labor cost increases. Moreover, aggregate analyses hide what happens at the product level 
(i.e., not all firms can be uncompetitive in a country).  
As a consequence of these observations, our arguments cast doubt on 
straightforward interpretations of “increasing unit labor costs” as a problem for some 
countries. The internal devaluation proposal (i.e., that to restore competitiveness, unit   6
labor costs, or their growth, should decrease) must not forget the consequences for the 
functional distribution of income.
8 In the final section of the paper we discuss alternative 
policy options. 
 
2. UNIT LABOR COSTS IN THE EUROZONE 
 
Although many firms surely do have data to calculate their unit labor costs as in equation 
(1), at the aggregate level (e.g., economy-wide, or just a sector) there is a problem. This is 
that although the numerator can be an average of the total money-wage compensation, 
and thus also be measured in euros per worker, the denominator, labor productivity, 
cannot be measured in pencils per worker. To calculate it, researchers use the economy’s 
(or sector’s) value-added in real terms (i.e., nominal value-added divided by the GDP 
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where, ULC is the unit labor cost, wn is the average money wage rate or labor 
compensation, ALP is labor productivity, VAr is real value-added (in euros of a base 
year), L is the number of workers, and P is the value-added deflator. This means that the 
aggregate unit labor cost, unlike that of a firm, is a unitless magnitude. Equation (2), 
however, is not the same as equation (1). 
Figure 1 shows the unit labor costs of 12 countries of the eurozone during 1980–
2007, calculated using equation (2). Data used throughout the paper is for the total 
economy. The source of all variables is the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org). Unit labor costs 
reported by the OECD are calculated as the ratio of total labor costs to real output. Real 
output is the constant price value-added, where the base year for real output is 2005. The 
share of labor income reported by the OECD database is calculated as the ratio of total 
labor costs to nominal output. The total labor cost measure is the compensation of 
                                                  
8 The internal devaluation proposal has another implication that we do not discuss. This is that a reduction 
in wages and costs in general, leads to higher debt. As the latter increases, public spending must be cut and 
taxes increased to service government’s debt.   7
employees adjusted for self-employment. The two are used to back out the price deflator 
used in the calculation of unit labor costs. 
The figure shows that unit labor costs have increased in all countries without 
exception, in some cases by a factor of 15 (e.g., Greece). The ratio of the 2007 value to 
the one for 1980 for Portugal is 9.5 (corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 
8.45%); for Spain and Italy, 4.7 and 4.5 (or an average annual growth rate of 5.31% and 
5.07%, respectively); and for Ireland 3.5 (corresponding to an average annual growth rate 
of 3.64%). The lowest increases were registered by Germany and the Netherlands, where 
the ratios are 1.6 and 1.7, respectively (average annual growth rate of 1.21% and 1.55%, 
respectively).  
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Source: OECD and authors’ estimates 
Note: AUT-Austria, BEL-Belgium, FIN-Finland, FRA-France, GER-Germany, GRC-Greece, IRL-Ireland, 
ITA-Italy, LUX-Luxembourg, NLD-Netherlands, PRT-Portugal, ESP-Spain 
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Under the standard interpretation of unit labor costs, the reason behind their 
increase is the fact that workers’ nominal compensation grew faster than labor 
productivity. Unfortunately, there is no data on nominal labor compensation for 1980–
1995 for Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Portugal. For the other countries, the highest 
ratios of the 2007 value with respect to that of 1980 are for Finland (4.3 times, 
corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 5.57%), Italy (5.2 times or an average 
annual growth rate of 6.33%), and Spain (5.4 times, or an average annual growth rate of 
6.43%); the lowest is for Germany (2 times, which translates into an average annual 
growth rate of 2.66%). Since 1995 (data available for all countries), the highest increases 
took place in Greece (ratio of the 2007 to the 1995 value is 2.2 and the average annual 
growth rate over the same period is 6.7%), Ireland (ratio is 1.91, or an average annual 
growth rate is 5.54%), and Portugal (ratio is 1.66 or the average annual growth rate is 
4.31%). Labor productivity, on the other hand, grew significantly less in all countries. We 
discuss this later in more detail, but it is important to remark now that labor productivity 
grew very fast in countries like Ireland or Portugal, in both cases significantly faster than 
in Germany. 
Often, however, comparisons are made relative to a country. To do this, since all 
data is in euros, we simply divide the unit labor costs (ULC), as calculated as in equation 
(2), for one country by that of the base country, which in our case we take to be 
Germany.  
Figures 2a and 2b show the 11 countries’ unit labor costs relative to that of 
Germany. The figures show that the relative unit labor costs of Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain have increased systematically since 1980. Post-1995, all ULCs 
increase vis-à-vis that of Germany. The largest increases are those of Greece, Portugal, 
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Source: OECD and authors’ estimates   10
We close this section by asking whether Germany should be the comparator. 
Often the southern European countries and Ireland are compared to Germany in terms of 
unit labor costs. However, this comparison is problematic, as their export baskets are 
significantly different. Using a data set covering 5,107 HS-6 digit products and 125 
countries, Abdon et al. (2010) document complexity (a combination of diversification 
and ubiquity of the export basket) at the country and product levels. Germany is the 
second-most complex economy in the world, after Japan. And it is the second most 
diversified country after Italy: Germany exports 2,113 of the 5,107 products with 
revealed comparative advantage (Italy exports with 2,241 products revealed comparative 
advantage).
9 Moreover, Germany exports significant shares of total world exports of the 
top ten most complex products (e.g., cumene (6.2%), methacrylic acid (31.6%), carbide 
tool tips (14.7%), photo, cine laboratories equipment (16%), hexamethylenediamine 
(2.9%), electronic measuring and controlling apparatus (17.4%), laser, light, and photon 
beam process machine tools (17%), sheet, plates, rolled of thickness 4.75mm plus, of iron 
or steel or other alloy steel (26.8%)). This means that, even though these products are 
tradable, their exports are concentrated in a very small group of countries, to which 
Germany belongs (together with Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, Finland, 
and the United Kingdom). Probably these countries exert significant market power. This 
also means that Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece do not compete directly with 
Germany in many products that they export and hence comparing their aggregate unit 
labor costs and drawing conclusions is probably misleading. Ireland, 12th in the 
complexity ranking (it exports only 421 products with revealed comparative advantage), 
is closer to the Netherlands (ranked 13th) and to the Czech Republic (14th); Spain is 
ranked 28th (it exports 1,747 products with revealed comparative advantage), at the level 
of countries such as Korea (22nd), Italy (24th), Mexico (29th) or Brazil (31st); Greece is 
ranked 52nd (it exports 1,060 products with revealed comparative advantage) and 
Portugal 53rd (it exports 1,188 products with revealed comparative advantage), close to 
China (51st).  
                                                  
9 The number of products exported with revealed comparative advantage reported here is the average 
number of products that the country exported with revealed comparative advantage during 2001–2007.   11
If we increase the number of products exported with revealed comparative 
advantage to the top 100 most complex, Germany’s exports of these products represent 
18% of world exports, against Ireland’s 0.81%, Spain’s 0.89%, Greece’s 0.02%, and 
Portugal’s 0.04% (see appendix table 1). Finally, while German exports are concentrated 
in the most-complex products of the complexity scale (the top 100 most complex 
products represent 7.93% of the country’s total exports), and as the complexity level 
declines, the shares become smaller (the least-complex export group represents 3.5% of 
Germany’s exports); in the case of Greece and Portugal, their exports are concentrated in 
the least-complex groups (33.1% and 21.7%, respectively, of their total exports belong to 
the least-complex group), and their export shares (by complexity groups) are similar to 
those of China (see appendix table 2). If China were the correct comparator, then perhaps 
the situation of the European countries would be significantly worse. 
We believe that this is where the real problem of the peripheral countries lies. 
Their lack of competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany is not due to the fact that they are 
expensive (their wage rates are substantially lower), or that labor productivity has not 
increased. The problem is that they are stuck at middle levels of technology and they are 
caught in a trap. Reducing wages would not solve the problem. 
 
3. UNIT LABOR COSTS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
Equation (2) can be written as: 
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This shows that the aggregate unit labor cost is nothing but the economy’s labor 
share (a unitless magnitude), 
l
n s , times the price deflator (also unitless). This is because: 
   12
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where, VAn is the nominal value-added and it equals (consistent with the National 
Accounts’ data) the total nominal wage bill/labor compensation (Wn) plus total profits 
(Πn). Wn can be expressed as the product of the average nominal wage rate (wn) and 
number of workers (L), and total profits can be expressed as the product of the ex post 
nominal profit rate (rn) times the capital stock (K).  ( ) ≡
l
n
nn sw L V A  is the share of labor 
in total output (both in nominal terms) and  ( )
k
n
nn sr K V A ≡ is the share of capital in total 
output (both in nominal terms). By definition, they add up to 1. This implies that a 
discussion of aggregate unit labor costs automatically entails a discussion of the 
functional distribution of income.
 10 
Figures 3a and 3b show the two components of the aggregate unit labor cost, 
namely, the labor share and the price deflator for the 12 countries. The figure shows that 
between 1980 and 2007, the labor share has declined in Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain. This implies that in 
these nine countries, the share of capital in total value-added increased. In Belgium and 
Portugal, it has remained almost constant; only Greece’s labor share does display an 
upward trend (the ratio of the 2007 to the 1980 values is 1.15. Greece started with the 
lowest labor share of all 12 countries in 1980, below 0.6). On the other hand, the 12 price 
deflators display a marked upward trend that compensates the constancy or decline of the 
labor share. This indicates that, except in Greece, the overall upward trend of the unit 
labor cost shown in figure 1 is, exclusively, the result of the increase in the price deflator.  
 
 
                                                  
10 The OECD database notes that, “the division of total labor costs by nominal output is sometimes also 
referred to as a real unit labor cost—as it is equivalent to a deflated unit labor cost where the deflator used 
is the GDP implicit price deflator for the economic activity (i.e., sector) concerned.” Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?lang=e&subject=19.We find this reference somewhat misleading 
because it confuses the reader with the possibility that unit labor costs can be calculated and analyzed in 
“real” terms, and because it ignores the implications for the functional distribution of income.    13























































































































































Labor Share ULC Price index (right axis)
 
 





































































































































































Labor Share ULC Price index (right axis)
 
Source: OECD and authors’ estimates 
Note: The labor share and ULC are shown on the left-hand side axis. The price index is shown on the right-
hand axis.   14
Why does this discussion matter? First of all, there is a question of interpretation. 
While at the firm level it is patently obvious what the unit labor cost measures, at the 
aggregate level it is less clear. Since it captures the economy’s labor share, normative 
statements about the need to contain increases in unit labor costs to maintain 
competitiveness inevitably imply an increase in the share of capital. Except in Greece, 
where capital’s share has declined, figure 4 shows a generalized increase in this share. In 
the case of Austria, it almost tripled during the period analyzed. This has important 
macroeconomic implications, analyzed in section 5.
11 
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Source: OECD and authors’ estimates  
 
  This point has one implication. This is that if unit labor costs provide a measure of 
competitiveness from the “workers’ side,” there is no reason why one could not calculate 
a parallel measure of competitiveness from the “capital side.” We can call it unit capital 
cost, and calculate it as the ratio of the nominal profit rate to capital productivity. This 
                                                  
11 This holds at any level of aggregation—national, sector, industry, or firm. It does not involve any 
assumption about the production structure or the nature of markets.   15
has to be equal to the product of the capital share in total value-added times the price 

















   













= =  (5) 
 
where, UKC is the unit capital cost, rn is the ex post nominal profit rate, VAn is nominal 
value-added, and K is the capital stock. 
Figure 5 shows that unit capital costs have increased in all eurozone countries. 
Marquetii (2003) documented that, over the long run, capital productivity displays a 
declining trend. Moreover, Glyn (1997) showed that profit rates also display a long-term 
tendency to decline. This means increasing unit capital costs are the result of a faster 
decline in capital productivity than in the profit rate.  
Given that both unit labor and capital costs are measures of the cost structure, the 
key question is: which one of the two has increased faster? Unit labor costs put the 
burden of adjustment on workers. Table 1 shows that increase in unit labor and capital 
labor costs for all 12 countries, for the whole period 1980–2007 and for the subperiod 
1995–2007. The results are very clear: in all countries, except in Greece, unit capital 
costs increased faster than unit labor costs. While the difference between the two 
variables varies across countries, the results indicate that the “loss of competitiveness” by 
some countries in the eurozone is not just a question of nominal wages increasing faster 
than labor productivity: in all countries, nominal profit rates decreased at a slower pace 
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Source: OECD and authors’ estimates 
 
Table 1: Unit Labor Costs and Unit Capital Costs in the Eurozone in 2007 relative 
to the Respective Levels in 1980 and 1995 
  2007 relative to 1980    2007 relative to 1995 
Country ULC  UKC    ULC  UKC 
Austria 1.46  5.39    1.02  1.55 
Belgium 1.92  2.73    1.18  1.32 
Finland 2.18  3.41    1.11  1.33 
France 2.02  3.98    1.17  1.32 
Germany 1.38  2.33  0.97  1.24 
Greece 17.06  12.10    1.61  1.55 
Ireland 2.63  7.02    1.40  1.85 
Italy 3.80  7.26    1.30  1.53 
Luxembourg 1.88  3.93    1.25  1.58 
Netherlands 1.51  2.47    1.27  1.44 
Portugal 8.94  10.71   1.42  1.44 
Spain 4.04  6.85    1.40  1.72 
Source: OECD and authors’ estimates 
   17
Second, the problem with the use of unit labor costs as a policy variable is that 
they consider the question of competitiveness from the firm’s angle. Workers do care 
about unit labor costs because the viability of the firm is at stake, but they also care about 
their real wage rate—that is, the buying power of their money wage rate across time—
and not about the firm’s unit labor costs. This poses the problem that, at times, analyses 
of unit labor costs and real wages may send different signals, interpreted differently by 
firms and workers. 
It is possible that both variables move in such a way that firms and workers see  
themselves as losing their positions (e.g., unit labor costs increasing and real wage rates 
being stagnant or even decreasing), or that one variable moves favorably for the 
corresponding group while the other variable moves unfavorably. When this happens, a 
conflict between labor and capital is unavoidable. This is probably happening in many 
countries today. 
How have real wage rates evolved in the eurozone since 1980? Since we do not 
have data for real wages before 1995, we use real average labor compensation (ALC) and 
assume that real wages follow the same pattern as the real ALC because wages are a 
major component of the latter. Labor productivity is calculated as real output (gross 
value-added) divided by the total number of employed persons. Real average labor 
compensation (real ALC) is obtained by dividing the nominal average labor 
compensation by the consumer price index (CPI). Data on nominal average labor 
compensation and labor productivity are for the total economy and are taken from the 
OECD.  
Table 2 provides a comparison between real ALC and ULC. In all countries for 
which data is available, we see that during 1980–2007, ULCs increased faster than real 
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Table 2: Real ALC and ULC 
Relative to 1980=100     Relative to 1995=100 
Country Real  ALC  ULC   country Real  ALC  ULC 
Austria 1.257  1.457   Austria 1.025  1.025 
Belgium 1.293  1.915   Belgium 1.089  1.185 
Finland 1.715  2.184   Finland 1.219  1.110 
France 1.263  2.024   France 1.129  1.174 
Germany 1.102  1.382   Germany 0.951  0.972 
Greece   17.056   Greece 1.370  1.612 
Ireland   2.627   Ireland 1.299  1.397 
Italy 1.232  3.802   Italy 1.021  1.302 
Luxembourg   1.880   Luxembourg 1.128  1.247 
Netherlands 1.076  1.513   Netherlands 1.127 1.265 
Portugal   8.936   Portugal 1.178  1.419 
Spain 1.212  4.038   Spain 1.005  1.395 
 
Figures 6a and 6b show both real wage rates and labor productivity for the 12 
countries. The evidence shows that in all of them, except in Greece and Portugal, labor 
productivity grew faster.
12 In some cases, like Germany and the Netherlands, the 
difference is very high. It is worth noting that these two countries registered the smallest 
increase in real wages during 1980–2007: the ratio between the 2007 and the 1980 values 
of real ALC are 1.10 and 1.07, respectively (which translates into very small average 
annual increases of 0.36% and 0.27%, respectively).
13 For the whole period, the highest 
increases in labor productivity took place in Ireland. Finally, we note that in the cases of 
Greece and Portugal, while it is true that both real and nominal average labor 
compensation grew faster than labor productivity during 1995–2007, the latter variable 
grew significantly, especially in Greece, which registered the second highest increase 
(after Ireland’s), with a ratio between the 2007 and 1995 values of 1.33, higher than those 
registered by the Netherlands (1.16) and Germany (1.17) for the same period.
14 
                                                  
12 For Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Portugal the comparison is for a shorter period due to lack of data 
on both variables for the complete period. 
13 It is important to note that Germany has registered small increases in both real wages and in productivity. 
Cheap labor from Eastern Europe helped hold down costs. 
14  We must add that the confusion between equations (1) and (2) noted at the start of section 2 affects 
policy discussions of inflation. For example, Posner (2010) regresses UK inflation on the four-quarter lead 
of annual growth in unit labor costs and argues that an empirical regularity of the UK economy is that unit 
labor costs are a significant predictor of inflation. This is hardly a surprise since equation (3) above shows 
that, by construction, the economy’s deflator (the consumer price index and the economy’s overall deflator   19
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are highly correlated) is a component of the aggregate unit labor cost, in the sense that the aggregate unit 
labor cost cannot be calculated independently of the deflator. Equation (3) in growth rates is 
^ ^^
n
l ULC s P =+ . To the extent that labor shares do not vary much from one period to the next (i.e., their 
growth rate is close to zero), a regression of inflation on the growth rate of unit labor costs must show a 
good fit, with a coefficient close to unity. The divergence from unity will be due to the omission of the 
labor share from the regression. It is obvious from equation (1) that this problem would not occur with 
physical data, as prices do not appear in the construction of the unit labor cost.   20
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM-LEVEL UNIT LABOR COSTS AND 
AGGREGATE UNIT LABOR COSTS 
 
While it is obvious that firms compete by trying to lower their unit labor costs (euros per 
pencil), countries do not compete by trying to lower their labor shares, at least 
consciously, although this is what calls for reductions in unit labor costs may effectively 
end up achieving. Nevertheless, one could ask if the aggregate unit labor cost is a good 
approximation to the average of the individual firms’ unit labor costs. If the answer is 
yes, then it could be used to discuss competitiveness. If the answer is no, how misleading 
is it?  
We can rewrite the aggregate labor share as a weighted average of the firms’ labor 
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where, 
i φ is the share of firm i’s value-added in total value-added, and 
i
l s is the share of 
labor in firm i’s value-added. Furthermore, recall that 
i
l s  is the ratio of labor 





wl u l c
s
pq p
==         ( 7 )  
 
where, wi is the average labor compensation in firm i, li is the number of employees in 
firm i, pi is the price charged by firm i, qi is the quantity produced by firm i, and ulci is 
the unit labor cost of firm i. Equation (7) shows that the firm’s labor share equals its unit 
labor cost divided by the selling price. 
Combining equations (3), (6), and (7), the aggregate unit labor cost (ULC) can be 
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that is, as the product of the sum of the firms’ labor shares (each weighted by its share in 
aggregate value-added) times the economy-wide price deflator. The firm’s labor share 
can be written as the ratio of its unit labor cost divided by the unit price charged. 
Equation (8) shows that, indeed, the aggregate unit labor cost captures the firms’ unit 












* , as there are two other variables to be taken into account: 
(i) aggregate price deflator (P); and (ii) price charged by each firm ( i p ). 
Suppose that the entire economy could be divided into two sectors—tradables (T) 
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As we saw earlier, aggregate unit labor costs increased in all 12 countries, and this 
was due to the increase in the aggregate price deflator (P), while the aggregate labor 
shares declined or were stable in 11 of the countries. The change in the aggregate labor 
share in this two-sector case is:   22
φφ φφ Δ= Δ + Δ + Δ+ Δ
nT N T T N T
lT lN T l T l N T l ss s s s ** **    ( 1 1 )  
 
where Δ represents the change in the variable. What are some plausible explanations for 
the decline in the aggregate labor share? Equation (11) indicates that this decline had to 
be the result of either or a combination of the following:  
 
(i) The sectors’ labor shares ( ,
TN T
ll ss) remain constant (so that ( / ulc p) remains constant 
and does not affect 
n
l s Δ ). Returning to equation (11), with Δ= Δ
TN T
ll ss =0, φ φ += TN T 1, 
and  φ φ Δ+ Δ = TN T 0, we can write the change in the aggregate labor share as: 
φφ φ Δ= Δ + Δ = Δ −
nT N T T N T
lT lN T l T l l ss s s s *** ( ) . A decline in the aggregate labor share 
requires that  φ Δ− <
TN T
Tll ss *( ) 0. There are two possible cases for this to happen: (a) 
0 T φ Δ<  with  >
TN T
ll ss () ; or (b)  0 T φ Δ >  with  <
TN T
ll ss () . Assuming firms set prices as a 
markup ( i μ ) over unit labor cost, that is, 
 
(1 ) ii i p ulc μ =+          ( 1 2 )  
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Under the (plausible) assumption that the nontradable sector has a higher markup because 
it is the more protected of the two, equation (13) implies that the labor share of the 
nontradable sector is lower than that of the tradable sector, i.e., 
TN T
ll ss > , i.e., case (a) 
above. This would mean that the share of the nontradable sector in the economy’s total 
value-added increased ( 0 NT φ Δ> ), and, consequently, the share in total value-added of the 
sector with a lower markup (or with a higher labor share, i.e., the tradable sector) 
declined ( 0 T φ Δ< ). In other words, what we should observe across the eurozone is a 
decline in the size of the tradable sector and an increase in that of the nontradable sector.   23
(ii) On the other hand, if the sectors’ shares in total value-added ( , TN T φ φ ) remain 
constant, the change in the aggregate labor share is  φφ Δ= Δ+ Δ
nT N T
lT lN T l ss s ** . The 
aggregate labor share will decline (i.e., Δ <
n










<−⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ Δ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, that is, if: (a) the 
absolute value of the ratio of the change in the labor share of the tradable sector to the 
change in the labor share of the nontradable sector is greater than the ratio of the share in 
total value-added of the nontradable sector to that of the tradable sector; and (b) the share 
of labor in the tradable and nontradable sectors change in opposite directions. If the 
nontradable sector is the more protected of the two, and the one with a higher and an 
increasing markup, then the labor share of the nontradable sector will experience a 
decline ( 0
NT
i s Δ< ) and the labor share of the tradable sector will increase ( 0
T
i s Δ> ) so 








⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ Δ ⎝⎠
 increases. In other words, given that there is an inverse relationship 
between the labor share and the markup, what we should observe is an increasing mark 
up in the nontradable sector together with a declining markup in the tradable sector. 
 
5. KALDOR’S PARADOX, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND THE EFFECTS OF 
CHANGES IN FACTOR SHARES ON AGGREGATE DEMAND 
 
Thinking of unit labor costs through the lens of the distribution dimension should make 
one reflect upon the concept of competitiveness in a different way from the traditional 
one. This is because, in standard analyses, an economy is deemed more competitive the 
lower its unit labor cost is. While, as we have noted, this may make sense at the firm 
level, the implications at the economy-wide level are potentially very different. The 
reason is that the flip side of this line of reasoning is that an economy is more competitive 
the lower its labor share is, ceteris paribus. Hence, a great deal of policies to lower unit 
labor costs are, effectively, polices to lower the share of labor in total income. However, 
are the economies deemed as the most competitive (i.e., the economies that grow fast 
and/or gain market share) those whose labor shares grow the least or even decline? The 
answer is that this need not be the case. Would it be sensible from a policy perspective to   24
conclude that the lower the labor share, the better off the economy? Surely there is 
something wrong here. The important aspect of this argument is that it may provide a 
reasonable explanation of Kaldor’s paradox and what may make sense at the firm-level, 
may not make it at the aggregate level. 
Indeed, at the theoretical level, a higher labor share need not necessarily lead to a 
less competitive economy. Kalecki (Osiatynski 1991) showed in a very simple income-
multiplier model that the level of national income is inversely related to the profit share 
(Blecker 1999). Likewise, Goodwin’s (1972) growth-cycles model locates the source of 
business cycles in the labor market, in particular in the effect of changes in the wage 
share on accumulation, where real wages and the labor share fluctuate in a cyclical 
fashion as a result of the impact of capital investment on employment. During an 
economic boom, the demand for labor rises and unemployment falls. This causes wages 
to rise faster than the economy as a whole, and hence leads to a fall in profits. As a result, 
investment in new capital is cut back and the economy moves to a downturn. In the 
slump, unemployment rises and wages are driven down, thus restoring profitability and 
leading to a revival of investment. Fluctuations are self-generating. In this model factor, 
shares oscillate between some boundaries in a self-reproducing orbit. All this indicates 
that the relationship between labor shares (or unit labor costs) and growth is much more 
complex, probably nonlinear (implying that the sign of the relationship between the two 
variables varies over time, and that the value of the elasticity is not constant), than the 
simple view that lower unit labor costs imply higher growth.
15 
Suppose, as discussed earlier, that firms set prices as a markup on unit labor costs. 
What occurs if the distribution of income shifts toward capital, as has happened in most 
of the eurozone during the period considered? This will probably lead to an increase in 
investment in the initial stages. However, a prolonged shift in the distribution of income 
toward capital will induce a decline in consumption. Sooner or later there will be a 
mismatch between supply and demand as the increase in capacity due to the increase in 
investment will not be accompanied by an increase in consumption demand. This is a 
                                                  
15 For example, in an analysis of the manufacturing labor share for Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, Onaran 
(2007) finds that the labor share is procyclical during a crisis in the three countries. On the other hand, 
during a normal year, the labor share has no cyclical pattern in Korea and Mexico, whereas in Turkey it is 
countercyclical, i.e., the labor share decreases in this country in both good years and in years when the 
economy contracts.   25
problem of lack of demand or what is known as underconsumption crisis. Capacity 
utilization will have to decline, then investment will be reduced; this will be followed by 
a decline in income, and then in production and in employment.  
Let us now assume a situation where workers win large wage increases and 
suppose firms respond by cutting their markups while still raising prices to some extent. 
Under these circumstances, the profit share 
n
k s  will fall. As income is redistributed to 
workers, that is, 
n
l s  increases, and since these have a higher marginal propensity to 
consume than capitalists, Kalecki’s model indicates that output will increase (consumer 
demand will increase, possibly stimulating investment too through the accelerator). In 
other words, a higher labor share leads to a higher level of income. In this case (i.e., 
redistribution of income towards workers) aggregate demand will be affected through a 
decline in investment and an increase in consumption, and aggregate supply will decline 
or grow at a slower pace.  
If, however, the increase in consumption is small or takes place slowly, then, as 
the profit share declines, a profitability crisis may emerge and unemployment will most 
likely develop. It is possible that the changes in consumption and investment cancel out, 
but this would be a fluke. In general, however, investment responds more quickly and 
sharply to these events than consumption, although it is possible that delayed changes in 
the distribution of income may result in (positive) changes in consumption that dominate 
the decrease in investment, thus avoiding the problem.  
In a so-called wage-led economy, a higher real wage rate or a higher labor share 
stimulates demand. Wage-led growth occurs when the impact of profits on investment is 
negligible—then an increase in the wage share leads to an increase in the equilibrium 
capacity utilization rate, which leads to an increase in the growth rate of the capital stock 
and growth. Wage-led growth occurs because the increase in consumption demand 
derived from the increase in the labor share has a positive feedback effect on investment 
through an increase in the capacity utilization rate. Because in this regime investment is 
not sensitive to profits, there is no dampening effect through changes in profitability from 
the labor share increase (Foley and Michl 1999: chapter 10). The result is overcontraction 
of domestic demand in a wage-led regime as a consequence of the implementation of 
policies that lead to a reduction in unit labor. Wage restraints depress consumption while   26
labor productivity growth brought about by, for example, downsizing of the labor force, 
reinforces the depressive effect (and outweighs the possible stimulating effect on 
investment and exports). This danger of a sharp decline in domestic demand tends to be 
overlooked in today’s policy discussions.  
This discussion has two implications. The first is that the relationship between the 
growth of aggregate unit labor costs (assuming there is a meaningful one) and that of 
output may well be positive, at least for some ranges of the data. And second, that it is 
not possible to talk about an economy’s competitiveness without addressing the 




Unit labor costs are one of the most widely used variables in the analysis of 
competitiveness. They are defined as the ratio of a worker’s total compensation or 
money-wage rate compensation to labor productivity in physical terms. Therefore, at the 
firm level, they are measured in the country’s currency (e.g., euros) per unit of output 
(e.g., per pencil). At the aggregate level, however, there is no physical equivalent of 
output, and value-added has to be used. This has very important implications for analyses 
and policy. The reason is that although the aggregate unit labor cost is related to the 
firms’ unit labor costs, the former is not a weighted average of the latter. This has several 
implications that question many analyses and policy recommendations: 
 
(i) Construction of unit labor costs using aggregate data (standard practice) is potentially 
misleading. Unit labor costs calculated with aggregate date are not just a weighted 
average of the firms’ unit labor costs. 
 
(ii) Aggregate unit labor costs reflect the distribution of income between labor and capital 
(i.e., the factor shares), and need not move one-to-one with firm-level unit labor costs. 
This means that one has to consider the economic implications of a reduction in the labor 
share (and the consequent increase in the capital share) if countries follow policies that 
lead to a reduction in unit labor costs.   27
(iii) Aggregate unit labor costs either may have little to do with overall growth (which 
provides one answer to Kaldor’s paradox), or the relationship between the two variables 
is not well captured by simple regressions. 
 
We have calculated and analyzed aggregate unit labor costs for 12 countries of the 
eurozone during 1980–2007, before the onset of the crisis. The analysis indicates that 
aggregate unit labor costs in all the eurozone increased. Greece and Portugal saw the 
fastest increases during this period (much faster than in the other countries) as a result of 
nominal wage rates that increased faster than labor productivity. Under our proposed 
view that aggregate unit labor costs are the economy’s labor share times the price 
deflator, the increase in unit labor costs (in all countries) was due to the increase in the 
price deflator used to calculate labor productivity. Except in Greece, aggregate labor 
shares declined or remained constant in the other 11 countries. We have discussed two 
possible reasons for this trend. One is that the nontradable sector of the economy, which 
probably applies a higher markup on unit labor costs, is gaining weight in the economy. 
A second reason is an increasing markup in the nontradable sector together with a 
declining markup in the tradable sector. 
  Parallel to the notion of unit labor cost, we have defined the concept of unit 
capital cost, the ratio of the nominal profit rate to capital productivity, and shown that it 
has increased faster than unit labor costs in all countries analyzed, except in Greece. 
What are the policy options for the eurozone countries as they struggle to come 
out of the crisis? The first is the implementation of an across-the-board austerity program 
(internal devaluation) amounting to a reduction in the wage bill and workers’ benefits. 
This may achieve stabilization, but at the expense of a painful recession. Moreover, this 
measure will be accompanied by huge losses by workers. If this option is pursued, firms 
should also share the burden by acknowledging that unit capital costs have increased 
significantly. We have argued that the comparison with Germany is, at least for some 
countries, misplaced. Using disaggregated data we showed that Germany is not the 
correct comparator as its export basket is very different from that of the southern 
European countries and of Ireland. What would an across-the-board reduction in nominal 
wages of 20%–30% achieve? The most obvious effect would be a very significant   28
compression of demand. But would this measure restore competitiveness? We argue that 
it would not allow many firms to compete with German firms, which have a different 
export basket, and in all likelihood it will not be enough to be able to compete with 
China’s wages. 
A second option, probably politically unfeasible, is to exit the euro and return to a 
national-currency system. This would probably lead to a devaluation and would have to 
be accompanied by measures such as industrial policy programs, including strategies to 
improve productivity.  
A third option is to reform the eurozone so as to allow a greater role for a much 
more active fiscal policy. This requires an analysis of the implications that this could 
have for the euro, but, in our view, is the most sensible option. This strategy should be 
combined with significant efforts to upgrade. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
should look upward and try to move in the direction of Germany, and not in that of 
China. The real problem is one of lack of nonprice competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany. 
Spain and Italy are ahead of the other three countries, and closer to Germany. Though 
Ireland has a very sophisticated export package, its level of diversification is low. Greece 
and Portugal are well below the other three and face a more precarious situation. 
Certainly this is not easy and it is only a long-term solution.   29
Appendix Table 1: Share in World Exports by Complexity Groups* 
Share in world exports  Countries 
Top 10  Top 100   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Austria  1.73  1.62  1.58  1.49  1.10  1.23  0.85  0.23 
Belgium  3.76  2.26  3.21  2.89  2.01  2.05  2.60  1.85 
China  1.22  1.28  2.72  8.08  10.78  13.97  12.96  13.35 
Finland  0.50  1.09  1.05  1.38  0.59  0.72  0.29  0.22 
France  5.11  3.57  5.78  6.08  5.43  5.58  3.08  1.59 
Germany  12.24  17.99  17.73  13.50  8.01  7.64  4.65  1.89 
Greece  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.16  0.13  0.24  0.31  0.37 
Ireland  1.25  0.80  2.71  2.26  1.21  1.50  0.51  0.11 
Italy  1.40  3.07  4.04  4.30  3.15  3.87  4.69  2.56 
Luxembourg  0.81  0.15  0.14  0.30  0.15  0.20  0.11  0.03 
Netherlands  5.11  3.50  2.93  3.51  3.17  2.76  3.50  2.73 
Portugal  0.05  0.04  0.30  0.23  0.48  0.48  0.56  0.52 
Spain  0.23  0.88  2.23  2.36  1.70  1.85  2.46  1.28 
*Figures are based on the averages of export values for 2001–2007 
**Countries with population of less than 2 million (except Luxembourg) were excluded from the 
calculation of total world export. Top 10 and Top 100 correspond to the most complex products; products 
are divided into six groups, 1 is the most complex product group and 6 the least. 
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Share in a Country’s Total Exports by Complexity Groups* 






Rank  Top 
10 
Top 
100   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Austria  1,369  8  0.23  6.17  30.38  23.29  19.00  14.99  8.83  3.52 
Belgium  1,470  10  0.23  3.84  27.81  20.30  15.55  11.26  12.12  12.96 
China  1,962  51  0.02  0.53  5.71  13.90  20.75  19.52  15.59  24.53 
Finland  765  5  0.10  6.11  30.09  31.99  15.19  13.14  4.52  5.08 
France  1,788  11  0.16  3.20  26.18  22.33  22.00  16.09  7.54  5.86 
Germany  2,113  2  0.19  7.90  39.62  24.50  16.01  10.85  5.61  3.40 
Greece  1,060  52  0.01  0.39  3.82  14.78  12.50  17.21  18.60  33.09 
Ireland  421  12  0.13  2.28  39.06  26.27  15.60  13.79  3.97  1.32 
Italy  2,239  24  0.06  3.47  23.16  20.06  16.16  14.12  14.54  11.96 
Luxembourg  588  9  0.78  3.88  19.22  33.53  18.10  17.60  8.27  3.28 
Netherlands  1,312  13  0.25  4.75  20.23  19.72  19.60  12.12  13.08  15.26 
Portugal  1,188  53  0.02  0.42  15.32  9.84  22.09  15.57  15.53  21.66 
Spain  1,745  28  0.02  1.89  24.18  20.80  16.53  12.77  14.46  11.25 
*Figures are based on the averages of export values for 2001–2007 
** Top 10 and Top 100 correspond to the most complex products; products are divided into six groups, 1 is 
the most complex product group and 6 the least. 
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